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ABSTRACT
IPHONE SECURITY ANALYSIS
by Vaibhav Ranchhoddas Pandya
The  release  of  Apple’s  iPhone  was  one  of  the  most  intensively  publicized  product 
releases in the history of mobile devices.  While the iPhone wowed users with its exciting 
design and features,  it  also outraged many for not allowing installation of third party 
applications and for working exclusively with AT&T wireless services for the first two 
years.   Software  attacks  have  been  developed  to  get  around  both  limitations.   The 
development of those attacks and further evaluation revealed several vulnerabilities in 
iPhone security.   In  this  paper,  we examine  several  of  the  attacks  developed for  the 
iPhone as a way of investigating the iPhone’s security structure.  We also analyze the 
security holes that  have been discovered and make suggestions for improving iPhone 
security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Apple’s iPhone has been the fastest-growing smart phone since its release on June 
29, 2007.  Its release was one of the most heavily publicized events in the history of 
mobile electronics devices.  Thousands of people lined up outside Apple stores prior to 
its release.  Approximately three and half million iPhones were sold within the first six 
months of its release in the U.S. alone [28].  The iPhone truly is a unique and innovative 
product and one of the biggest success stories for any product in any market.  A brilliant 
business idea by Apple, it banked on the ever-growing popularity of Apple’s products 
like the iPod and the iMac.  Even though it was a first-timer in the smart phone industry, 
Apple immediately outpaced traditional cell phone giants like Nokia, Motorola, and LG 
with the iPhone.  The iPhone is an all-in-one package including a cell phone, a digital 
music and video player, a camera, a digital photo, music, and video library, and much 
more [1].  It has helpful widgets for maps, weather, and stocks on top of email and other 
Internet capabilities [1].
Figure 1. The iPhone
The iPhone confirms that Apple truly understands consumers’ desires, not only in 
terms of functionality,  but also in terms of appearance and style.   Other smart  phone 
companies have offered products that include features offered by the iPhone.  However, 
none of the other products approach the iPhone in terms of popularity and sales.  We now 
survey some of the features of this “all-in-one” device.
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1.1 FEATURES
The iPhone comprises an array of features that can be broken down into three 
categories: a) Phone b) iPod, and c) Internet.  Here, we look at each feature category in 
detail.
1.1.1 PHONE
Besides making and receiving telephone calls, most cell phones and smart phones 
allow text and picture messaging and incorporate a camera and often a music player.  The 
iPhone provides all  of  that  through a more practical  and appealing user interface.   It 
allows you to quickly merge calls with a tap or two.  Text or SMS messaging is made 
easier with a QWERTY soft keypad [1].  iPhone’s Visual Voicemail feature shows the 
length of the voice mail and its sender, allowing the user to go directly to the desired 
voicemail  [1].  For pictures,  iPhone has an impressive photo management  application 
with the ability to zoom in and out of pictures and “flip” through them as one can do with 
a traditional album [1].  
1.1.2 IPOD
Over past few years,  the iPod has become synonymous with digital  music and 
video players.  In the iPhone Apple took advantage of the iPod’s popularity by including 
complete  iPod  functionality.  Music,  videos,  and  even  ringtones  can  be  browsed  and 
purchased  through  the  iTunes  Wi-Fi  Store  [1].   The  iPhone  includes  a  3.5-inch 
widescreen  display  for  watching  videos  or  TV shows or  movies  purchased  from the 
iTunes store [1].
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Figure 2.  People waiting to get iPhone in New York [36]
1.1.3 INTERNET
Internet and email access via smart phones is not new.  Palm Trio, Blackberry, 
and Motorola Q have all had reasonable success in this market.  iPhone offers this facility 
and more with a better user experience.  Its Safari is a full-functioned web browser that 
allows the user to zoom in and out with just one touch [1].  Its Maps application allows 
users to view maps and points of interest and get directions.  Small widgets to retrieve 
information  including  stocks and weather  reports  are  offered,  and so is  the ability to 
watch videos on YouTube using the built-in YouTube player [1].
1.1.4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEATURES
With the iPhone, Apple introduced some truly innovative technologies that make 
the user experience easier and more fun.  Its Multi-Touch touch screen display allows 
gliding, scrolling, and zooming by finger touch [1].  The iPhone run OS X, which Apple 
claims  to  be  the  “world's  most  advanced  operating  system  [1]”  and  which  allows 
intensive  application  multitasking  [1].   In  terms  of  wireless  technology,  iPhone  uses 
“quad-band  GSM,  and  supports  AT&T's  EDGE  network,  802.11  b/g  Wi-Fi,  and 
Bluetooth  2.0 [1].”   It  employs  accelerometer,  often  found in  digital  cameras,  which 
detects the orientation of the phone to utilize its entire screen width [1].
1.2 HARDWARE
The  iPhone  uses  the  ARM  1176JZF-S  processor,  which  offers  good  power 
management for superior battery life and powerful processing for 3D graphics.  Further 
details regarding this processor are available on the ARM product website [15].  Figure 3 
shows how different functions within the iPhone interface with one another [37].  Figure 
4 shows an image of the board inside an iPhone.
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Figure 3.  iPhone architecture from a high level [37]
Figure 4.  Board showing different parts in iPhone
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2 MOTIVATION
Apple and AT&T signed a contract according to which iPhones can only be used 
with AT&T wireless service for the first two years.  AT&T agreed to give a portion of its 
revenue to Apple per each new contract  it  signed with iPhone users.  This agreement 
spawned outrage among users of other GSM-based wireless services such as T-Mobile 
since they could not offer services to iPhone customers.  Many people saw this as an 
unfair  move  by the  two companies.   People  felt  that  they  should  be  able  to  choose 
whatever wireless service they prefer and should not be forced to use a particular one.
There  was  another  reason  that  several  iPhone  users  became  irritated.   Apple 
designed  iPhone  as  a  “closed”  system that  does  not  allow installation  of  third-party 
applications.  Users can only access a very small subset of the file system, a “sandbox” 
where they can add and remove music and other files via iTunes.  Users wanted to install 
useful and fun third-party applications like widgets and games.
Figure 5.  An "unlocked" iPhone claimed to be world's first [2]
These two limitations placed on iPhone users prompted a series of hack and attack 
efforts by iPhone enthusiasts and hackers.  “Jailbreak” is an iPhone hack that permits the 
addition of third-party applications  or gadgets on the iPhone by permitting read/write 
access  to the root file  system [39].   Without  “jailbreaking” an iPhone,  a  customer is 
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limited to the factory-installed tools included with it.  “Unlock” is an attack on iPhone 
that allows it to be used with any wireless service offering the GSM standard, not just 
AT&T.  Without “unlocking” an iPhone, one can only use AT&T’s wireless services. 
Jailbreaking is the more important of the two because it is the first step to unlocking. We 
look at a jailbreak attack in detail and also learn about different unlocking solutions.
Due to  the  commercial  success  of  the  iPhone,  it  makes  a  good candidate  for 
security analysis.  Having close to a million iPhones jailbroken and unlocked within first 
six months of its release, iPhone security has significant financial  implications.   With 
more than six million users worldwide, any security holes can in iPhone can jeopardize 
privacy of millions  of people.   Such possibilities  solidify the need to analyze  iPhone 
security.
3 JAILBREAKING
The process of gaining root access to the iPhone so that third party tools can be 
installed is called Jailbreaking.  Without gaining read-write access to the root system, one 
is not able to install third party applications on iPhone.  This is found to be very limiting 
to thousands of iPhone owners who feel restrained from doing whatever they want to do 
with  a  their  iPhones—products  that  they own.   Several  other  fascinating  and helpful 
gadgets are available for people to use, so why should they be restrained from using 
them?  To provide an analogy, it would be like buying a computer and not being allowed 
to  install  new programs on it–being  forced  to  use existing  programs only.  There are 
several websites including  www.Installerapps.com that provide interesting gadgets and 
games  for  iPhone.   Some  of  the  “most  popular  games  are  iSolitaire,  iZoo,  Tetris, 
iPhysics,  and  NOIZ2SA  [4].”   Beyond  providing  access  to  these  fun  games  and 
interesting tools, jailbreaking is absolutely crucial for one more reason: unlocking.
Without jailbreaking, one cannot install the necessary application to use a wireless 
service  other  than  AT&T  (in  the  U.S.).   Close  to  a  million  new  iPhones  were  not 
activated with AT&T in their first six months [28].  Without jailbreaking, these iPhone 
owners  would not  be able  to  use  the  phone part  of  the  iPhone unless  they signed a 
contract with AT&T after switching from their existing GSM wireless service provider. 
Even for AT&T customers, jailbreaking is still highly desirable for enabling the addition 
of third party applications to the iPhone.
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3.1 LOOKING FOR IDEAS
How can Jailbreak be achieved?  iPhone enthusiasts and hackers all around the 
world  were  looking  for  ideas  for  achieving  this  goal.   A feasible  solution  has  to  be 
reasonably  easy  to  use  and  should  not  take  several  hours  to  complete.   Hackers 
investigated various techniques for meeting these requirements.  They evaluated existing 
hacks for other phones and devices and searched for similar vulnerabilities in the iPhone.
A previous  hacker  success was using buffer  overflow techniques  on the Sony 
PSP.  By exploiting a vulnerability in the Tag Image File Format (TIFF) library, libtiff, 
used for viewing TIFFs, hackers were able to hack PSP to run homebrew games, which 
was normally prohibited [5].
Hackers inspected Apple’s MobileSafari web browser to see if it could be targeted 
for the same vulnerability.  It turned out that for firmware version 1.1.1 of the iPhone, 
MobileSafari uses a vulnerable version (3.8.1 or earlier) [6] of libtiff [7].  The exploitable 
vulnerability  in  libtiff  is  documented  as  entry  CVE-2006-3459  in  Commom 
Vulnerabilities  and Exposures, a database tracking information security vulnerabilities 
and  exposures  [6].   This  vulnerability  is  also  documented  and  tracked  in  the  U.S. 
National Vulnerability Database [10].  A malicious TIFF file can be created to include 
the desired rogue code.  When attempting to view the malicious tiff file in MobileSafari 
(utilizing the vulnerable version of libtiff), the vulnerabilities in libtiff are exploited to 
create a stack buffer overflow, and the malicious code is injected and executed.
3.2 STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW AND RETURN-TO-LIBC ATTACKS
The attack we review, which exploits the libtiff vulnerability,  uses stack buffer 
overflow to inject the code and the return-to-libc technique to execute it.  Let us look at 
how a stack buffer overflow can be created and how a return-to-libc attack works by 
looking at an example.
Consider the piece of code below [29]:
void func (char *passedStr) {
char localStr[4];
strcpy(localStr, passedStr);  // length of passedStr is not checked
}
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int main (int argc, char **argv) {
func(argv[1]);
}
Say, our program is called myprog.  Now, let us look at a simplified representation of the 
stack when myprog is executed with “hi” in table 1 below.
Parent function’s stack
Return address (4 bytes)
char* passedStr
hi\0        (4 bytes allocated for localStr. String up to 3 characters is a good input)
Table 1.  Simplified stack representation with proper input
Now, consider the stack when myprog is executed with the string “goodsecurity.”
Parent function’s stack
“rity” (return address overwritten)
“secu” (char* passedStr overwritten)
“good”  (expected 3 characters + \0, got 12)
Table 2.  Simplified stack representation with corrupting input
As is clear from the figures above, our program is only capable of handling a 
string with three characters plus NULL.  When a string of more than three characters is 
passed, the extra characters cause stack buffer overflow and overwrite other sections of 
the stack. Our function func should have performed a string length check on passedStr to 
ensure that it has three characters or fewer before the NULL.  Any piece of code that 
makes a mistake similar to the one in our function func() can cause stack buffer overflow.
Matters could get much worse if an attacker finds out about the vulnerability in 
our function.  Instead of passing “security,” a carefully crafted string could be passed in 
which the last four characters, in our example, are replaced by the hex value of a pre-
existing  function  in  memory  [30],  say  “secu\x12\x34\x56\x78.”   In  little-endian, 
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discussed  later,  the  value  would  be  0x78563412,  which  might  be  the  address  of  a 
function, say, system().  When the stack unwinds, instead of execution returning to the 
calling  function,  the  pre-existing  function  indicated  by  the  overwrite  bytes  will  be 
executed (in this case, system()).  Moreover, the stack could be overwritten by passing 
desired values that could serve as parameters to a pre-existing function [30].  Such an 
attack  is  known  as  the  return-to-libc  attack.   By  discovering  the  address  of  such  a 
function, an attacker can use this technique to execute the function to achieve desired 
behavior.   Furthermore,  by passing a carefully crafted malicious  input that  exploits  a 
stack overflow, an attacker can inject malicious code that gets executed as a chain of calls 
to such pre-existing functions.
3.3 LIBTIFF VULNERABILITY 
A vulnerability similar to that in the example above is found in libtiff  version 
3.8.1 and earlier: an area of memory is accessed without performing an out-of-bounds 
check.  The vulnerability is in function TIFFFetchShortPair in the tif_dirread.c file [6]. 
That function fetches a pair of bytes or shorts, as the name implies.  It should throw an 
error if the request is to fetch more than two bytes or shorts.  Instead, it  fetches any 
arbitrary number of bytes requested.  This vulnerability was fixed in libtiff version 3.8.2. 
The source code for both versions of libtiff can be downloaded from the Maptools.org 
website [8].  Below are excerpts of that function in libtiff versions 3.8.1 and 3.8.2.  First, 
let us look at the snippet from version 3.8.1:
static int
TIFFFetchShortPair(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* dir)
{
switch (dir->tdir_type) {
case TIFF_BYTE:
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
uint8 v[4];
return TIFFFetchByteArray(tif, dir, v)
&& TIFFSetField(tif, dir->tdir_tag, v[0], v[1]);
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}case TIFF_SHORT:
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
uint16 v[2];
return TIFFFetchShortArray(tif, dir, v)
&& TIFFSetField(tif, dir->tdir_tag, v[0], v[1]);
}
default:
return 0;
}
}
Now, let us look at the snippet from version 3.8.2, which has the fix for the vulnerability. 
It is also obvious from the developer’s comments.
static int
TIFFFetchShortPair(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* dir)
{
/*
 * Prevent overflowing the v stack arrays below by performing a sanity
 * check on tdir_count, this should never be greater than two.
 */
if (dir->tdir_count > 2) {
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata, tif->tif_name,
"unexpected count for field \"%s\", %lu, expected 2; ignored",
_TIFFFieldWithTag(tif, dir->tdir_tag)->field_name,
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dir->tdir_count);
return 0;
}
switch (dir->tdir_type) {
case TIFF_BYTE:
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
uint8 v[4];
return TIFFFetchByteArray(tif, dir, v)
&& TIFFSetField(tif, dir->tdir_tag, v[0], v[1]);
}
case TIFF_SHORT:
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
uint16 v[2];
return TIFFFetchShortArray(tif, dir, v)
&& TIFFSetField(tif, dir->tdir_tag, v[0], v[1]);
}
default:
return 0;
}
}
To take advantage of the vulnerability in the TIFF library, a malicious TIFF file 
must be constructed.  To accomplish that requires a reasonable working knowledge of the 
TIFF file format.  There are two important objectives to keep in mind while constructing 
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a  malicious  TIFF  file:  causing  buffer  overflow  and  injecting  code.   The  iPhone  is 
constructed  around  an  ARM  processor,  thus  some  knowledge  of  it  is  required  for 
successful code injection.  Next, we further discuss TIFF and give a brief overview of the 
ARM processor.
3.4 TIFF
The TIFF standard is owned and maintained by Adobe.  It is tag-based format 
used primarily for scanned images [12].  A TIFF file has a header section and descriptive 
sections at the top of the file with offsets pointing to the actual pixel image data [13]. 
This means that a poorly constructed file may have tags pointing to incorrect offsets or 
offsets beyond the end of the file.  Such aberrations can also cause buffer flow for poorly 
written  programs that  read and manipulate  tiff  images  [13].   Some examples  of  tags 
include image height, image width, planar configuration, and dot range.  Different tags 
give necessary information about the image including color, compression, dimensions, 
and location  of  data.   Below is  an example  of a  tiff  file  (in the value column)  with 
descriptions obtained from Adobe [12].
Offset Description Value
(hex) (numeric  values  are  expressed  in 
hexadecimal notation)
Header:
0000 Byte Order 4D4D
0002 42  002A
0004 1st IFD offset 00000014
IFD:
0014 Number of Directory Entries 000C
0016 NewSubfileType 00FE 0004 00000001 00000000
0022 ImageWidth  0100 0004 00000001 000007D0
002E ImageLength 0101 0004 00000001 00000BB8
003A Compression 0103 0003 00000001 8005 0000
0046 PhotometricInterpretation 0106 0003 00000001 0001 0000
0052 StripOffsets 0111 0004 000000BC 000000B6
005E RowsPerStrip 0116 0004 00000001 00000010
006A  StripByteCounts 0117 0003 000000BC 000003A6
0076 XResolution 011A 0005 00000001 00000696
0082 YResolution 011B 0005 00000001 0000069E
008E Software 0131 0002 0000000E 000006A6
009A DateTime 0132 0002 00000014 000006B6
00A6 Next IFD offset 00000000
20
Values longer than 4 bytes:
00B6 StripOffsets Offset0, Offset1, ... Offset187
03A6 StripByteCounts Count0, Count1, ... Count187
0696 XResolution 0000012C 00000001
069E YResolution 0000012C 00000001
06A6 Software “PageMaker 4.0”
06B6 DateTime “1988:02:18 13:59:59”
Image Data:
00000700 Compressed data for strip 10
xxxxxxxx Compressed data for strip 179
xxxxxxxx Compressed data for strip 53
xxxxxxxx Compressed data for strip 160 …
The first  two bytes  in an Image File Directory (IFD) represent the number of 
directory entries (14 in the example above) [12].  The IFD then consists of a sequence of 
tags, 12 bytes each [12].  The first two bytes identify the field, and the next two identify 
the field type: short int, long int, byte, or ASCII [12].  The next four bytes specify the 
number of values, and the final four specify the value itself or an offset to the value [12].
Below is a sample tiff image taken from [14].
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Figure 6.  Example of a TIFF image [14]
Since TIFF files are binary, their contents are best viewed in a hex editor.
3.5 ARM PROCESSOR
Since  ARM processor  ARM1176JZF-S  is  used  in  the  iPhone,  some  working 
knowledge regarding its architecture and instruction set is required for this study.  ARM 
is a RISC-based processor.  Below is a high-level diagram of ARM1176JZF-S obtained 
from the ARM website [15].
The ARM processor can be configured in either little-  or big-endian modes to 
access its data [17].  The iPhone runs the ARM processor in little-endian mode.  In little-
endian mode, if a value in a register is 0x12345678, it appears in memory as 0x78 0x56 
0x34 0x12.  This is further illustrated in the figures 8 and 9 below.
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Figure 7.  ARM 1176JFZ-S processor [15]
Information regarding endian type is important in both writing the exploit and reverse-
engineering it.  Another important piece of information about the ARM architecture is 
that  the  stack  is  non-executable,  unlike  in  the  x86  architecture.   The  stack  grows 
downward in the ARM architecture.  Detailed documentation of the ARM architecture 
and instruction set is available at the ARM website [31].
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Figure 8.  Big-endian [18]
Figure 9.  Little-endian [18]
3.6 DRE AND NIACIN’S TIFF EXPLOIT JAILBREAK
We now have  accumulated  the  expertise  required  to  understand  and  partially 
reverse-engineer the libtiff exploit for jailbreaking developed by two teenagers Dre and 
Niacin.  For their project, the process was in fact the reverse of ours; the attack was first 
chosen and different required tools were picked up as deemed necessary.   The source 
code for the attack is available on Dre and Niacin’s website [32].
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First, we verify and demonstrate the overflow problem.  Though the exploit was 
created for the iPhone, we can demonstrate the overflow on a Windows PC in cygwin to 
mimic  a  Unix-like  environment.   First  the  exploit  source  code  was  downloaded  and 
compiled.  Then, a malicious TIFF was created for version 1.1.1.
$g++ itiff_exploit.cpp –o a.exe
$./a.exe 1.1.1 > badDotRange.tiff
Figure 10.  Malicious TIFF blocked by Norton AntiVirus
An interesting outcome occurred while we attempted to create badDotRange.tiff.  The file 
creation was blocked by Norton AntiVirus software running on the machine used, as it 
detected  the  file  as  “Bloodhound.Exploit.166  [33]”  as  shown  in  figure  10.   Further 
information  on  the  vulnerability  shows  Norton  characterizing  badDotRange.tiff  as  a 
Trojan and a Virus, as shown in figure 11 [33].
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Figure 11.  Bloodhound.Exploit.166 trojan [33]
Once the work area was put in the list of directories to be excluded by Norton AntiVirus, 
badDotRange.tiff was finally created; a Hex Editor view of it is presented in Appendix A.
1.
Next, we demonstrate the malicious TIFF file causing buffer overflow in libtiff. 
We  also  show a  well  formed  TIFF  file  being  handled  properly  by  libtiff.   For  this 
purpose,  vulnerable  libtiff  was  downloaded,  configured,  and  compiled.   libtiff.a  was 
copied to work area.  The program driver.cpp was written to simulate the Safari browser 
using libtiff to view a TIFF image.  Below is a snippet from that program written in C++.
int main() {
  cout << "Start!" << endl;
  TIFF* tif = TIFFOpen("c:/thesis/tiffExp/t1.tiff", "r");
  if (tif) {
    cout << "Opened file successfully" << endl;
26
  } else {
    cout << "FAILED to open tiff file" << endl;
  }
  TIFFClose(tif);
  cout << "End!" << endl;
  return 0;  
}
Next,  badDotRange.tiff  is  copied  to  t1.tiff  and  driver.cpp  is  compiled,  linked  with 
libtiff.a, and run, which results in a segmentation fault.
$cp badDotRange.tiff t1.tiff
$g++ -I /usr/local/include –g driver.cpp –c
$g++ driver.o –L. –ltiff –o driver.exe
$./driver.exe
Start!
Segmentation fault <core dumped>
The program execution sequence is described below.
TiffOpen() calls TIFFReadDirectory(), which upon encountering the DotRange tag calls 
TIFFFetchShortPair () as can be seen from the following snippet from tif_dirread.c.
case TIFFTAG_DOTRANGE:
(void) TIFFFetchShortPair(tif, dp);
break;
case TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE: …
As seen earlier, that function allocates memory for two shorts, but instead receives the 
request to fetch 255 of them.  Below is the corresponding line in the source code of the 
attack.
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0x50,0x01,0x03,0x00,0xff,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x84,0x00,0x00,0x00,
If  we change  to  use  little-endian  instead,  the  first  two bytes  become 0x0150,  which 
represents the DotRange tag [12].  The next two bytes give us the value 0x0003, which 
means the data type is SHORT [12].  The next four bytes gives us the number of different 
values for this tag, which is 0x000000ff or 255 in decimal [12]. Finally, the final four 
bytes give us 0x00000084 – the offset to the actual values for the tag [12].  By looking at 
the TIFF specification  [12] and also looking at  the code for the corrected version of 
libtiff, 3.8.2 [8], we see that the number of different values expected is two for DotRange. 
As seen in the stack buffer overflow example, attempting to fetch 255 shorts causes a 
stack buffer overflow.  In our example, the program overwrites the return value in the 
stack,  changing  it  to  some  area  in  memory  that  is  not  accessible,  resulting  in  a 
segmentation fault.  Below, the line in badDotRange.tiff corresponding to the DotRange 
tag is shown, as it appears in Hex Editor.  Though it is insignificant here, note that certain 
characters  are  not  translated  properly from a hex editor  to  the  word processor.   The 
twelve bytes corresponding to the DotRange tag appear from 0x74 to 0x7f.
0000070: 0100 0000 5001 0300 ff00 0000 8400 0000 ....P...........
 Thus far, we have solved half of the problem of creating an attack by gaining 
control of the stack.  Before we move on to injecting particular code and executing it, we 
first  confirm  that  a  well  formed  TIFF  file  is  not  recognized  as  a  virus  by  Norton 
AntiVirus and does not cause a crash when opened with our program.  We noted that the 
culprit  in  badDotRange.tiff  was  the  number  values  set  for  the  DotRange  tag.   The 
function expected it to be 2, but we used 255 instead.  File t1.tiff, which is the same as 
badDotRange.tiff, can be opened in a hex editor and 0xff at 0x78 above can be changed 
to 0x02 and saved as goodDotRange.tiff.  However, since Norton flagged a malicious tiff 
file, we wanted to create a well formed one programmatically and confirm that it does not 
get flagged.  To do that, we take the libtiff exploit source code and modify one byte in the 
line of source code shown earlier: we change 0xff to 0x02.  We compile and then execute 
our program, saving the output in goodDotRange.tiff.  We note that the file was created 
successfully without being flagged by Norton AntiVirus.  The attempt to open that file 
with our program was successful, as shown below.
$cp goodDotRange.tiff t1.tiff
$./driver
Start!
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Opened file successfully
End!
We now look at the code that provides root access to the iPhone and observe how 
it  is  executed.   As mentioned earlier,  this  exploit  uses the return-to-libc technique  to 
execute a sequence of pre-existing functions.  These pre-existing functions come from the 
dynamically loaded libSystem.dylib, which can be disassembled and searched for blocks 
of code that perform desired tasks [34].  The iPhone only allows access to a small section 
of the file system to add and remove music and other files.  This “sandbox” area is the 
directory /var/root/Media.  The algorithm used in the exploit renames /var/root/Media to /
var/root/OldMedia [32]. It then creates a symbolic link with /var/root/Media pointing to 
root, “/” [32].  Next, it remounts root with the “MNT_UPDATE” flag to make it writable 
[32].  The malicious tiff file is crafted skillfully to set up the stack to call the necessary 
functions from libSystem.dylib.   Each of those functions must be studied carefully to 
discover how many values it reads from the stack and in what registers. The stack pointer 
must be set appropriately, and the link registers must be set properly for the next function 
call.  With this method the exploit uses pre-existing functions to make the iPhone root 
writable–in other words, it “jailbreaks” the iPhone.
4 UNLOCKING
The iPhone is considered unlocked when it is able to use a cellular service other 
than  that  of  AT&T.   There  are  several  free  and  paid  software  unlocking  solutions 
available  on the Internet  including  AnySIM, TurboSIM, and SimFree.   Among these 
solutions,  AnySIM  seems  to  be  quite  popular,  particularly  because  it  is  free.   It  is 
developed by a group of people known as the iPhone dev team.
AnySim works by patching the firmware on the baseband [11].  We can predict 
that somewhere in the baseband firmware, there is code that checks whether the SIM card 
being used is AT&T’s.  If the check passes, the baseband allows the phone part of the 
iPhone to work normally.   Conversely,  if the check fails, the phone function does not 
work.  AnySim performs a patch to the firmware so that it skips the above check and 
jumps to the section of code that executes when the check passes [11].  This procedure 
unlocks the iPhone because a SIM card from any GSM wireless carrier can then be used 
to make phone calls.  If the baseband firmware is upgraded or downgraded, the iPhone 
gets locked again, as the patch that skips the check discussed earlier will no longer be 
29
available.  To unlock the phone again, AnySim version designed to work with upgraded 
version of baseband firmware can be used.
SimFree,  also  known as  iPhone  SimFree  or  IPSF,  is  unlocking  software  that 
currently sells for approximately $60, and at one point cost $99 [26].  Since it is a paid 
product,  details  about  how it  works  are  not  revealed.   It  does  not  rely  on  firmware 
patching, so a phone unlocked with SimFree remains unlocked even when a baseband 
upgrade is performed [11].
TurboSim is another paid solution for unlocking.  It tricks the iPhone SIM card 
checking function into thinking it is an AT&T SIM card by providing an International 
Mobile Subscriber ID (IMSI) and an Integrated Circuit Card ID (ICC-ID)—also known 
as SIM Serial Number (SSN) [27].  For TurboSim to work, it must be programmed with a 
valid AT&T SIM, which it copies for later use [27].
5 JAILBREAKING AND UNLOCKING NEWER VERSIONS OF IPHONE
As mentioned earlier, for the purposes of this project, firmware version 1.1.1 and 
baseband bootloader version 3.9 are assumed.  Apple has since released versions 1.1.2, 
1.1.3, and 1.1.4 of the firmware.  Also, the baseband bootloader version is found to be 4.6 
in some of the newer phones.  How can these phones be jailbroken and unlocked?
We use a simple approach:  on newer versions of the iPhone, we downgrade the 
firmware to version 1.1.1 and the bootloader to version 3.9.  Then we already know how 
to jailbreak and unlock the iPhone.
First we discuss how to downgrade an iPhone with firmware version higher than 
1.1.1.  Several hacker websites including iphone.unlock.no offer instructions on how to 
do that and also have different firmware files available for download.  For our example, 
one downloads version 1.1.1.  To downgrade, the iPhone first must be put into recovery 
mode.   The iPhone appears to be turning off  when the Power and Home buttons are 
pressed and held simultaneously for several seconds while the phone is connected to the 
computer [11].  The Power button is then released while the Home button is continuously 
depressed.  After a few seconds, the iPhone will enter recovery mode and will be detected 
by iTunes [11].  Once in recovery mode, the version with which the iPhone is to be 
restored with can be selected [11].
In order to get the telephone part of the iPhone working, the baseband must be 
downgraded to a version that corresponds to firmware version 1.1.1.  In this paper, we are 
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more interested in the fact that baseband downgrading can be achieved than in the steps 
required  for  it.   Websites  such  as  iphone.unlock.no  provide  simple  procedures  and 
tutorials for doing the downgrade.  Essentially, since we were able to downgrade iPhone 
firmware to version 1.1.1, iPhone can be jailbroken as discussed earlier.  Now that we 
can install third party applications, a “Baseband Downgrader [11]” tool can be installed 
to downgrade the baseband.
Unlocking is not possible if the iPhone has version 4.6 or higher of bootloader 
because that version requires a secpack—a special password—to modify the baseband 
[22].  Unlocking cannot be achieved without modifying the baseband.  Since version 3.9 
of the bootloader does not require any passwords, the baseband can be modified, and 
unlocking can be achieved.  For that reason a “bootloader downgrader” tool gbootloader 
was  developed  by  George  Hotz  and  made  available  to  iPhone  users  [2].   The  tool 
downgrades the bootloader from version 4.6 to version 3.9 so that a patch to the baseband 
can be made and the iPhone can be unlocked.
As hackers continued their  efforts  to learn more about bootloader version 4.6, 
they learned that every time a new version of the baseband is released, the password to 
modify the existing one is available in it [2].  This is the only way the bootloader would 
allow the iPhone to perform an update on the baseband.  For example, when firmware 
1.1.4 was released, it contained the password for version 1.1.3.  A person with iPhone 
firmware version 1.1.3 and bootloader version 4.6 would be able to update the baseband. 
During the update process, version 1.1.4 would provide the password for version 1.1.3 to 
the bootloader, which then would allow the baseband to be modified—i.e.,  updated in 
this  case.  With each release of a new version of the firmware,  hackers were able to 
discover  the  password  for  the  older  version.   With  this  knowledge,  unlocking  was 
achieved  by  keeping  bootloader  version  4.6  but  downgrading  the  baseband and  then 
patching it.
Several  other  small  utilities  have  been  developed  in  addition  to  the  ones 
mentioned here, which allows users to sort out different versions of firmware, baseband, 
and bootloader and make appropriate choices.  Tools have been developed to upgrade the 
firmware on jailbroken phones to pick up some of the latest features developed by Apple 
for the iPhone.
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6 OTHER MALICIOUS ATTACKS
Attacks  that  we  have  examined  so  far  do  not  truly  carry  the  intention  to  be 
malicious, though the libtiff attack certainly could be malicious, depending on the type of 
code injected.  For jailbreaking, the code injected was non-malicious—both behavior and 
intention-wise.  However, using the libtiff vulnerability, malicious code could certainly 
be injected for a malicious attack.  Now, let us examine a couple of malicious attacks 
created by a group of researchers at Independent Security Evaluators by exploiting other 
vulnerabilities; those attacks give us further insight into iPhone security.  Details of the 
attacks discussed below are not revealed; the goal of the researchers was to make Apple 
aware  of  some  of  the  issues  and  not  to  let  the  hackers  find  out  the  details  of  the 
vulnerabilities and the attacks.  The attacks expose well known security weaknesses in 
the OS X operating system used in the iPhone, including lack of address randomization 
and executable heap [19].
The  first  attack  consists  of  an  exploit  written  to  attack  Safari  on  the  iPhone. 
When a  malicious  HTML document  was  visited  using  MobileSafari,  the  iPhone was 
forced  to  make  a  connection  to  an  outbound  compromised  server  controlled  by  the 
attackers [19].  The attackers were secretively and automatically able to obtain personal 
data  including  contacts,  call  history,  text  message,  and  voice  mail  from the  attacked 
iPhone [19].  Attackers concluded that further personal information including passwords 
and emails could have been obtained had they chosen to do so [19].  What makes this 
attack even more dangerous is the ease with which it can be carried out.  A link to a 
compromised website could be sent via email, and the iPhone owner could be lured into 
visiting it. That is all it would take to capture all of the personal data of the iPhone owner.
A second exploit was written to perform physical actions on the phone such as 
making a system sound and vibrating [19].  This exploit was run on the iPhone when 
another malicious HTML was viewed using Safari browser.  To make matters worse, 
certain API functions discovered during this exploit could have allowed it to send text 
messages, dial phone numbers or even record audio and transmit it over the network [19]. 
This vulnerability is particularly dangerous since the phone bill or text messages bill can 
get run up by the attacker, which could cost the iPhone’s owner hundreds of dollars.  Not 
only  that,  the  attacker  could  send  maliciously  provocative  messages  to  the  owner’s 
contacts, which could result in personal or professional relationship problems.
These malicious exploits collectively are as bad as having one’s iPhone stolen.  If 
the possibility of attacks like these becomes public knowledge, we have to believe that 
iPhone owners would be extremely careful in terms of what information they save on the 
phone or what websites they visit.  In fact they would often refrain from using several 
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useful features of the device, which would diminish the purpose of owning it in the first 
place.  A potential customer would reconsider buying the iPhone.
While details of the attacks above were not disclosed, let us look at the high level 
approach used in the above MobileSafari attacks.  The information could certainly be 
used as guidelines for the attacks above as long as one is able to write payloads for them. 
The iPhone uses Webkit, an open source web browser engine used by Mobile Safari [21], 
which in turn uses the Perl Compatible Regular Expression Library (PCRE).  One of the 
first versions of iPhone used a version of PCRE that was more than a year old.  Several 
versions of PCRE had been released with several bug fixes since the version used by 
iPhone.  One of the bug fixes found in the change log of a newer version 6.7 [24] follows.
“A valid  (though odd) pattern that looked like a POSIX character class but used an 
invalid character after [ (for example [[,abc,]]) caused pcre_compile() to give the error  
‘Failed:  internal error: code overflow’ or in some cases to crash with a glibc free()  
error. This could even happen if the pattern terminated after [[ but there just happened 
to be a sequence of letters, a binary zero, and a closing ] in the memory that followed.”
Now, one can review the bug fix and immediately get ideas on possible attacks on 
the  iPhone.   The  attackers  used  the  above  vulnerability  and  constructed  a  regular 
expression in an HTML file that attacked the vulnerability when the file was viewed in 
Safari.  The HTML document used was constructed as below [20]:
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"><!--
var re = new RegExp("[[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]]
[[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]]
[[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]]
[[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]]
[[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]]
[[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]][[**]]
[[**]]
[[**]]ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFG[\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\
x07\x09\x0b\x0e\x0f\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x17\x19\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1f\x20\x21\x22
\x23\x25\x26\x27\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2f\x30\x32\x33\x35\x37\x39\x3a\x3b
\x3c\x3e\x3f]XYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR");
</script> 
To develop the exploit, the attackers resorted to a technique called “fuzzing [20],” 
which involves passing different inputs that cause a given program to crash and then 
analyzing the crash to gain insight about the program.  From the crash reports, they were 
able to get useful information such as the stack pointer and values in different registers. 
They then employed a technique to overwrite the return address on the stack to point to 
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the heap area where the shell code was injected [20].  The shell code then executed and 
did the job of stealing private information. The code consisted of “typical socket connect, 
open,  read,  and  write  functions  [20].”   The  researchers  figured  out  the  system  call 
numbers for those functions and used them.  The researchers have revealed some of the 
functions they used to perform physical actions on the phone including making a system 
sound, dialing phone calls,  and sending SMS text messages.  Those functions include 
“AudioServicesPlaySystemSound  from  the  Audio  Toolbox  library  and  CTCallDial, 
CTSMSMessageCreate,  and  CTSMSMessageSend  from  the  Core  Telephony  library 
[20].”  The functionality of each function is clear from its name.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Having examined several  vulnerabilities  in the iPhone and attacks  that  exploit 
those  vulnerabilities,  we can  analyze  the  iPhone security  structure  from a high  level 
instead of merely analyzing specific details.  What was the approach Apple took while 
designing  the  security  architecture  for  the  iPhone?   What  were  the  flaws  in  the 
philosophy?  What high-level approaches can be used to exploit the security flaws?  What 
are some of the ways that Apple can either fix some of the vulnerabilities or at least make 
it difficult for an attacker to exploit them?  Let us try to answer some of these questions.
It  is  clear  that  iPhone is  an extremely vulnerable  device with several  security 
holes.   The iPhone security philosophy itself  has a major flaw.  Apple’s approach to 
making the iPhone a secure device was to reduce “the attack surface of device [19]” or 
“the device’s exposure to vulnerabilities  [19].”  To achieve this, Apple allowed write 
access only to a sandbox area in the file system and disallowed installation of third-party 
applications.  Several features of Safari were removed in Mobile Safari, including the 
ability  to  use plug-ins  like  Flash and the  ability  to  download certain  file  types  [19]. 
Mobile  Safari  was  restricted  to  only  execute  Javascript  code,  and  only  do  so  in  the 
sandbox area [19].  We see a pattern here: rather than allowing freedom and flexibility to 
the  user  by  making  the  system robust  and  secure,  Apple’s  approach  was  to  make  a 
controlled, closed-box device.  Apple’s security approach is illustrated in the following 
analogy: rather than teaching a child how to swim to prevent him from drowning, he is 
simply not allowed to jump in a lake.
While the security philosophy itself is flawed, the architecture too has tremendous 
holes.  Since Apple banked on preventing the iPhone from being compromised in the first 
place, it  put very little effort into protecting different parts of the device individually. 
This conclusion is seen in the fact that all significant processes run as a super user or with 
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administrative privileges [19]—a great mistake from a security perspective.  A result of 
this configuration is that an attacker is able to control the entire iPhone if he is able to 
exploit a vulnerability in any one of its applications [19].  For example if Mobile Mail 
were  compromised  by an  attack,  the  attacker  could  also  gain  access  to  contacts  and 
pictures.  In simple terms, the iPhone’s security architecture looks like a home owner 
putting all effort for securing his or her home into buying the best possible lock to stop an 
intruder from getting in.  No effort is made to further lock each individual room or to put 
valuables in a safe-deposit box.  While it may be difficult to enter the house, if a thief can 
do so, he can steal all its contents.
A large  security  hole  is  also  created  by the  fact  that  the  iPhone uses  several 
applications  including  MobileSafari  and  MobileMail  that  are  based  on  open  source 
projects.   Furthermore,  several  open  source  libraries  are  used  in  multiple  iPhone 
applications;  for  instance,  libtiff  and  Webkit  are  used  in  both  MobileSafari  and 
MobileMail.  Use and sharing of open source projects is beneficial except when old and 
outdated versions of those projects are used.  Earlier we looked at examples of an old 
version of libtiff library facilitating the jailbreak attack and an old version of the PCRE 
library allowing another malicious attack.  The reason that open source software presents 
such problematic security holes is that all an attacker has to do is look at the latest version 
of an open project, say Webkit, and look at the one being used in an iPhone application 
that utilizes it.  Then attacker can check the log of all vulnerabilities addressed since the 
version used in iPhone and start working on an exploit for that vulnerability.  To make 
matters worse, the attacker can easily download source code for different versions of the 
open  source  project  being  used  to  further  help  him  develop  the  exploit.   By  using 
outdated versions of open source projects, Apple has made it easier for hackers to come 
up with ideas and approaches for different attacks.
Apple  also  failed  to  make  the  exploitation  of  vulnerabilities  challenging  for 
hackers.   By  not  utilizing  common  techniques  such  as  Address  Space  Layout 
Randomization (ASLR) or non-executable heap in the version of OS X used for iPhone, 
Apple  has  not  posed  any  particular  difficulties  for  hackers  in  the  development  and 
distribution of exploits for vulnerabilities [19]. 
Apple did employ some good practices and has shown more effort  recently in 
making the iPhone more secure.  That has not stopped the hackers, however, as they have 
found solutions  to the obstacles  presented by Apple.   For example,  the stack is  non-
executable in the iPhone, so an attacker cannot simply add payload to the stack via buffer 
overflow and execute it.  However, a non-executable stack does not protect against the 
return-to-libc  attack,  which  was  employed  in  the  jailbreaking  attack,  as  we observed 
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earlier.  New versions of firmware have been released with certain vulnerabilities fixed to 
prevent jailbreaking.  They have been countered by the ability to downgrade the firmware 
and by hackers coming up with new methods of jailbreaking.  Apple also attempted to 
prevent unlocking by using a new version of the bootloader.  That attempt failed because 
hackers found a way to downgrade the bootloader.  One could argue that Apple’s attempt 
to prevent unlocking was driven more from a business standpoint than from a security 
one.
After evaluating Apple’s security for the iPhone, one can safely conclude that 
overall the company has failed badly in several respects in making the iPhone a secure 
device.  Looking at the security approach and the decisions the company made, it is no 
surprise that the iPhone is a highly vulnerable device.
8 ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE DECISIONS BY APPLE
Now that we have had a chance to analyze the iPhone’s security structure, we can 
ask several questions regarding different choices Apple has made.  Why are they using 
versions of open-source based packages that are about a year out of date?  Why did they 
choose to have almost all important processes run as super user?  Why did they not use 
ASLR?  The most important question of all is why did they not use version 3.8.2 of the 
tiff  library?   This  final  question  is  major  because  even  after  three  new versions  of 
firmware and a new version of the bootloader, Apple is still paying for this mistake.  That 
one weak link makes jailbreaking possible to the present day.
It would be interesting to know whether Apple had knowledge of the vulnerability 
in libtiff 3.8.1 and older versions.  If it did have knowledge of the vulnerability, it would 
be a big mistake on Apple’s part to disregard that information and use vulnerable version 
of  libtiff  anyway,  especially  since  this  vulnerability  is  well  known  in  the  hacking 
community and other mobile devices including Sony’s PSP had been hacked using it.
We  can  speculate  on  explanations  for  Apple  using  the  vulnerable  version  of 
libtiff.   Perhaps there was an existing version of Safari with the vulnerable version of 
libtiff ready to be used with iPhone.  One can certainly see that there are a lot of costs 
involved in using a new version of libtiff in Safari, which would have to be thoroughly 
tested prior to being deployed in a new version for iPhone.  Perhaps Apple figured that 
there were other known vulnerabilities that were not fixed in 3.8.2 anyway, so there was 
not much to be lost by retaining one or more vulnerabilities.  Perhaps Apple performed a 
cost analysis of losses suffered by delaying the new version of firmware versus losses due 
to the number of people who would hack the iPhone to jailbreak it and eventually unlock 
it and use a wireless service other than that of AT&T.  Such a decision would express 
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disregard for consumer security, since the same vulnerability could be used to perform 
truly malicious acts.
From a business perspective, it may have been the right decision for Apple to go 
with vulnerable version of libtiff even with the knowledge of vulnerabilities.  However, 
from the consumer confidence or reputation perspective, that decision could not possibly 
be a good one.  Apple is generally regarded as a company that delivers secure and robust 
products.  This is debatable in computers, as hackers normally target a bigger pool of 
users, which happen to be PC users.  While a lot of hacking efforts have been done for 
iPhone  with  good  intentions—to  allow  third  party  applications—some  of  the  same 
vulnerabilities  used for jailbreaking  could be used to  perform truly malicious  acts  as 
discussed  earlier.   While  the  hacking  community  is  happy  to  have  Apple  present  a 
vulnerable system so that they can open up a closed system, a customer who is content 
with his or her iPhone as-is cannot feel good that his or her product and the information 
in it are extremely vulnerable.
On the other hand, if Apple did not know about the vulnerability in libtiff, it is a 
serious shortcoming on their part, especially when a very similar attack was used to hack 
Sony’s PSP.  Buffer overflow has been one of the most popular attack methods of the 
1990s and continues to be so in the new millennium [9].  
It is difficult to determine whether Apple hired several folks and asked them to 
brainstorm ways the iPhone could be hacked if not actually hack it.  Apple could have 
then either addressed its vulnerabilities or at least they could have questioned some of 
their own decisions.  As we saw earlier, the jailbreak attack via libtiff was developed by 
two teenagers.  Apple could have come up with a few internships and a few free iPhones 
to  get  some perspective.   Furthermore,  several  security  evaluators  approached  Apple 
upon discovering  vulnerabilities  in the iPhone.  Apple  could have used a  more  active 
approach by hiring such security experts to evaluate the iPhone security architecture.  
For now, the questions we posed earlier in the section will remain unanswered, 
and we can only speculate.
9 SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY STRUCTURE
We have pinpointed several flaws in the iPhone security structure.  If Apple fixes 
these flaws, it will make the iPhone a much more secure device.  First and foremost, 
Apple needs to change its security philosophy.  Instead of trying to limit the exposure of 
the device to vulnerabilities, it needs to make the device more robust.
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A large security hole could be filled if most of the processes are not run with 
administrative privileges, or as the super user, in the iPhone.  That way if an attacker is 
able to compromise an application, he would only have limited privileges—the privileges 
of the particular application [19].  This will prevent the attacker from gaining full control 
of an iPhone.
While using open-source based applications is a good idea, Apple needs to be 
more cognizant about using the latest versions to keep up with bug fixes.  It needs to 
come up with a mechanism to perform updates on the iPhone when critical vulnerabilities 
are discovered and fixed in the open-source packages being used.
Apple could use the technique of ASLR for heap and stack address randomization 
to make it more difficult for hackers to develop stable attacks and distribute them [19]. 
Moreover, it could develop a mechanism that prohibits both writing to and executing an 
area of the heap.   Some attacks  copy the exploit  payload into heap area that  is  both 
writeable  and executable,  and they execute  it  there.   If an area in heap was not both 
writeable  and  executable,  such  attacks  would  be  thwarted.   Also,  if  ASLR  were 
employed, even if an attacker could successfully write an attack that relies on an address 
in the stack or heap, distribution of the attack usually would not succeed, as the target 
address is unreliable due to randomization.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have been able to learn a significant amount about the iPhone’s 
security structure and its vulnerabilities.  The jailbreaking attack analyzed here required 
knowledge of  vulnerabilities  in  MobileSafari  and in  the  tiff  library.   The  attack  also 
required  knowledge  of  the  ARM architecture  and  the  tiff  file  format  to  construct  a 
malicious  tiff  file  that  takes  advantage  of  the  vulnerabilities  in  the  tiff  library.   We 
learned that using a vulnerable version of the tiff library in older versions of the iPhone 
proved costly for Apple and continues to cost the company even though newer versions 
of the iPhone use the more robust version of the tiff library.  This is true because hackers 
have found ways to downgrade the phone to use a vulnerable version of the firmware and 
continue to jailbreak it.  We do see some effort by Apple to make the iPhone more robust. 
However,  hackers  have  found  new  ways  to  jailbreak  the  iPhone  without  having  to 
compromise features introduced in newer versions of the iPhone.  The resulting sequence 
of security improvements and attack improvements has turned into a cat and mouse game 
between Apple and the hackers.
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These  security  problems  have  resulted  in  financial  losses  for  both  Apple  and 
AT&T and reputation losses for Apple.  For each iPhone that was unlocked to access an 
alternate  wireless  carrier,  AT&T lost  at  least  approximately  $1500  for  the  two-year 
contract period.  As we noted earlier, number of such iPhones is close to a million in just 
first six months [28].  Apple too missed out on some gains, as it is contracted to receive a 
certain  amount  from  AT&T  for  each  iPhone  activated  with  AT&T.   The  security 
vulnerabilities of the iPhone have also affected Apple’s reputation as a company, as it 
had been generally believed to deliver more secure products.  While Apple’s exclusive 
deal with AT&T and its decision to use a closed-box system have nothing to do with 
security directly, those choices did fuel the motivation to attack the iPhone.  It may be 
that during these attacks more vulnerabilities were discovered that may not have been 
discovered otherwise.
We have also learned that while malicious attacks certainly can be created for the 
iPhone, most of the actual attacks have not expressed particularly malicious intentions 
but were mainly expressions of strong beliefs that people should be able to do whatever 
they want with their telephone product in terms of adding interesting gadgets or choosing 
a wireless service carrier.  As is likely the case for attacks by hackers more generally, 
other motivations include ego inflation, recognition, and admiration by peers.
We can conclude that Apple’s initial effort in making the iPhone a secure device 
was  quite  disappointing.   While  Apple  is  working  to  improve  the  iPhone’s  security, 
hackers have found new ways to hack it by exploiting its vulnerabilities.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Hex dump of badDotRange.tiff
0000000: 4949 2a00 1e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  II*.............
0000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0800  ................
0000020: 0001 0300 0100 0000 0800 0000 0101 0300  ................
0000030: 0100 0000 0800 0000 0301 0300 0100 0000  ................
0000040: aa00 0000 0601 0300 0100 0000 bb00 0000  ................
0000050: 1101 0400 0100 0000 0800 0000 1701 0400  ................
0000060: 0100 0000 1500 0000 1c01 0300 0100 0000  ................
0000070: 0100 0000 5001 0300 ff00 0000 8400 0000  ....P...........
0000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 3876 6f00  ............8vo.
00000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 8c36 2531  .............6%1
0000100: ac76 6f00 bc76 6f00 0000 0000 0000 0000  .vo..vo.........
0000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6076 6f00  ............`vo.
0000120: fcad 0030 3055 0130 6c76 6f00 0000 0000  ...00U.0lvo.....
0000130: 8c36 2531 cf76 6f00 ac76 6f00 0000 0000  .6%1.vo..vo.....
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0000140: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000150: 9476 6f00 00f8 0d30 0073 0230 d176 6f00  .vo....0.s.0.vo.
0000160: cf76 6f00 0000 0500 a876 6f00 d067 0230  .vo......vo..g.0
0000170: d576 6f00 2f76 6172 2f72 6f6f 742f 4d65  .vo./var/root/Me
0000180: 6469 6100 2f76 6172 2f72 6f6f 742f 4f6c  dia./var/root/Ol
0000190: 646d 6564 6961 002f 0068 6673 002f 6465  dmedia./.hfs./de
00001a0: 762f 6469 736b 3073 3100 0a              v/disk0s1..
A.2 Hex dump of goodDotRange.tiff
0000000: 4949 2a00 1e00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  II*.............
0000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0800  ................
0000020: 0001 0300 0100 0000 0800 0000 0101 0300  ................
0000030: 0100 0000 0800 0000 0301 0300 0100 0000  ................
0000040: aa00 0000 0601 0300 0100 0000 bb00 0000  ................
0000050: 1101 0400 0100 0000 0800 0000 1701 0400  ................
0000060: 0100 0000 1500 0000 1c01 0300 0100 0000  ................
0000070: 0100 0000 5001 0300 0200 0000 8400 0000  ....P...........
0000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
00000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
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00000e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 3876 6f00  ............8vo.
00000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 8c36 2531  .............6%1
0000100: ac76 6f00 bc76 6f00 0000 0000 0000 0000  .vo..vo.........
0000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 6076 6f00  ............`vo.
0000120: fcad 0030 3055 0130 6c76 6f00 0000 0000  ...00U.0lvo.....
0000130: 8c36 2531 cf76 6f00 ac76 6f00 0000 0000  .6%1.vo..vo.....
0000140: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................
0000150: 9476 6f00 00f8 0d30 0073 0230 d176 6f00  .vo....0.s.0.vo.
0000160: cf76 6f00 0000 0500 a876 6f00 d067 0230  .vo......vo..g.0
0000170: d576 6f00 2f76 6172 2f72 6f6f 742f 4d65  .vo./var/root/Me
0000180: 6469 6100 2f76 6172 2f72 6f6f 742f 4f6c  dia./var/root/Ol
0000190: 646d 6564 6961 002f 0068 6673 002f 6465  dmedia./.hfs./de
00001a0: 762f 6469 736b 3073 3100 0a              v/disk0s1..
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